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SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Post-Conviction Hearing Act, and a permanent strain in state and
federal court relations as the federal courts repeatedly discover that "no
hearing of any sort was accorded petitioner . . . in the courts of North
Carolina despite a modem and enlightened procedural machinery ade-
quately designed to determine the basis of historical facts under-
lying constitutional questions and to review such questions."78
ELLEN KABCENELL WAYNE
Criminal Procedure-United States v. Santana: A Reinterpreta-
tion of the Katz Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test
In its application of fourth amendment protection against unreas-
onable searches and seizures' the United States Supreme Court has be-
come increasingly sensitive to the policies that are the foundation of
that amendment since the appearance of the "reasonable expectation
of privacy" standard in Katz v. United States2 in 1968. Katz repre-
sented a philosophical shift in the Court's approach to governmental
intrusions into citizens' lives, moving the focus from the location and
structural components of the area invaded toward a more flexible and
somewhat subjective standard that requires an examination of circum-
stances in which an individual may justifiably rely upon an expectation
of privacy.'
In the recent case of United States v. Santana4 the Court appears
to have misread and misapplied the Katz standards. Officers of the
Philadelphia Narcotics Squad, acting on probable cause but without a
warrant, had driven to defendant Santana's residence and, finding her
in her doorway, proceeded to arrest her. The Court found that San-
78. Anderson v. North Carolina, 221 F. Supp. 930, 931 (W.D.N.C. 1963).
I. The full text of the amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no
Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONsr. amend. IV.
2. 389 U.S. 347 (1968). The phrase "reasonable expectation of privacy" comes
from Justice Harlan's concurring opinion. Id. at 361; see note 51 infra.
3. 389 U.S. at 352-53.
4. 96 S. Ct. 2406 (1976).
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tana's visibility in her doorway necessarily demonstrated that she had
no expectation of privacy under Katz and that her doorway thereby be-
came a "public place."' ; The arrest was therefore held to be valid
under a prior ruling" that no warrant is necessary to arrest a suspect
in a public place when there exists probable cause to arrest.7  There
was no discussion of Santana's actual expectation of privacy, or of the
reasonableness of such an expectation, as the Katz test would seem-
ingly have required. Although there is some question whether search
criteria should be applied to arrests," the importance of Santana is that
it appears to indicate that the Court will use the Katz holding only in
a conclusory manner following the determination of the fourth amend-
ment issue according to pre-Katz standards. While the result in San-
tana appears justifiable on its facts, the decision represents a severe
setback to the individual's right to privacy in an age of advanced sur-
veillance techniques.
On August 16, 1974, an undercover agent of the Philadelphia Nar-
cotics Squad used an intermediary to purchase several packets of heroin
from defendant Santana. The agents provided the money and the
impetus for the purchase. Immediately after the purchase, the inter-
mediary was arrested within a block and a half of the purchase site
(defendant's residence), providing some likelihood that word of the
arrest would quickly reach defendant.' Acting without a warrant but
with sufficient information to satisfy probable cause requirements,10
agents returned to defendant's residence intending to arrest her.'1
5. Id. at 2409.
6. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
7. 96 S. Ct. at 2409.
8. The three concurring Justices and the two dissenting Justices argued the case on
the basis of seizure rather than search criteria. Id. at 2410 (White, Stevens & Stewart,
JJ., concurring); id. at 2411-12 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting). Given the
number of state statutes, see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 844 (West 1970); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 70.078 (1971); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-807 (1975), federal statutes, see, e.g., 18
U.S.C. § 3052 (1970) (FBI agents); 18 U.S.C. § 3056(a) (1970) (Secret Service
agents); 18 U.S.C. § 3601 (1970) (post office agents); 21 U.S.C. § 878 (1970) (Drug
Enforcement Administration agents), and federal court decisions, see, e.g., United States
v. McKinney, 379 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1967), that would support the action of the agents
in this case, it would appear that the case would not have been decided differently under
seizure-criteria. But see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2305 (1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§§ 4701 & 4702 (1974); ALI, MODEL CODE OF PRE-APRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 220.1
(3) (1975); Note, The Neglected Fourth Amendment Problem in Arrest Entries, 23
STAN. L. Rv. 995 (1971).
9. 96 S. Ct. at 2412 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
10. That there was a strong case for probable cause was determined by the district
court. Id. at 2409.
11. Id.
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When the agents arrived at defendant's residence, she was
standing in her doorway; a step forward would have put her outside
the house and a step back would have put her within the house. 12 The
officers rushed from their van shouting "police," whereupon defendant
retreated into her home where officers followed and took her into
custody. A search incident to the arrest" turned up packets of a sub-
stance that later proved to be heroin, as well as some of the marked
money that the agents had furnished the intermediary.
14
At trial in federal district court, defendant Santana moved to sup-
press the evidence. In an oral opinion, the District Court for the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania granted the motion on the ground that the
agents failed to obtain a warrant.' 5 The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit affirmed the decision without opinion.'6 The United
States Supreme Court reversed, holding that defendant Santana's
doorway was a "public place," and that a warrantless arrest does not
violate the fourth amendment when an individual is arrested upon pro-
bable cause in a public place.17 The Court found support for its public
place determination in language from Katz and Hester v. United
States,'8 to the effect that fourth amendment protection does not ex-
tend to those things that one exposes to public view. This portion of
the opinion is extremely brief, providing no explanation for the choice
of these particular cases and offering scant analysis of their facts in light
of their holdings. In addition, the Court avoided holding that one's
doorway is a "public place."
A right of personal privacy,19 as such, is nowhere guaranteed to
the individual by the Constitution.20  Although the Bill of Rights
was intended to provide the individual with the maximum feasible pro-
12. Id. at 2408 n.1.
13. The packets fell to the floor as the agents apprehended Santana, id. at 2408;
therefore their seizure of the heroin was not constitutionally invalid. See Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
14. 96 S. Ct. at 2408.
15. Id. at 2409.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
19. Privacy is defined in many ways, but it seems that the ability to control access
to information about oneself is at the heart of the term. One's appearance, actions and
thoughts may provide information about one's self. It is the ability to control access to
these that gives us a sense of privacy. See Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482-83
(1968).
20. But see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965), in which the Court
found a constitutional right of privacy to be implied by at least five of the Bill of Rights
amendments. Accord, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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tection against governmental intrusion into his or her private life, the
right to privacy only became an issue in the courts in the late
nineteenth century.2' In Boyd v. United States22 in 1886, the Court
recognized that it was not the danger of physical intrusion that so con-
cerned the drafters of the Bill of Rights, but rather it was the threat
of forcible exposure of information that an individual might have ex-
pected to keep private that was of primary concern. Governmental
search and seizure of personal property involves property rights,2  cer-
tainly, but the fundamental constitutional issue concerns an individual's
right to control access to information about himself.
24
Early in the development of case law analyzing fourth amendment
searches, the courts began to require that the individual take some
responsibility for the protection of his privacy from governmental
intrusion. In 1924 in Hester v. United States,2  the Court approved
the actions of government agents who, acting on reliable information,
approached to within one hundred yards of defendant's farm house to
observe him selling illegal whiskey. This "search" and the subsequent
seizure of incriminating evidence were upheld on the ground that the
fourth amendment does not protect people who act in "open fields,
' 02
though the agents apparently were trespassing on Hester's land at the
time of the search and were acting without a warrant.
21. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). "In
very early times . . . the 'right to life' served only to protect the subject from battery in
its various forms; liberty meant freedom from actual restraint; . . . now the right to life
has come to mean the right to enjoy life,-the right to be let alone . . . ." Id. at 193.
See also Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891). "No right is held more
sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." Id. at 251.
22. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). The Court reversed a circuit court decision re-
quiring that defendant turn over invoices to federal revenue agents and finding that
such compulsory production violated the fourth and fifth amendments. Referring to
Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765), a case that was viewed as partially
responsible for the inclusion of the fourth amendment in the Bill of Rights, the Court
said:
[The principles laid down in Entick] apply to all invasions on the part of the
government and its employes of the sanctity of a man's home and the priva-
cies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his
drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of
his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and private prop-
erty ....
Id. at 630.
23. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 n.4 (1967) (citing Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 509 (Black, J., dissenting)).
24. See note 19 supra; Note, From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-
Katz Study of Fourth Amendment Protection, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 968, 978 (1968).
25. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
26. Id. at 59.
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The open fields doctrine is one of the more conservative appli-
cations of the fourth amendment. The appellation "open fields" is
misleading, since Hester was actually within the yard of his
farmhouse;2 7 therefore, in Hester the Court restricted fourth amend-
ment protections at least to enclosed spaces, and probably to the home
of an individual. "8 The trespass of the searchers in no way invalidated
the search,20 and the line of cases drawing authority from Hester has
upheld the use of searchlights, high powered field glasses and other
surveillance technology.30
Olmstead v. United States," decided in 1928 in conjunction with
Hester, provided the analytical framework for fourth amendment cases
for nearly forty years. Out of Hester came the line of cases delineating
those areas that were subject to fourth amendment protection, while
Olmstead provided the rationale for dealing with fourth amendment
violations of those areas. In Olmstead, the Court held that a physical
invasion of an area subject to fourth amendment protection was neces-
sary to sustain a violation, and thus, words that leave a home via tele-
phone wires are beyond protection.-
3 2
The Hester-Olmstead cases led to a fairly rigid framework into
which the Court had to fit subsequent search and seizure cases.
Following Hester and Olmstead the courts determined, first, whether
the area in question could be termed a constitutionally protected area3"
and, second, whether a trespass upon that area had been committed.
Under this rationale, constitutionally protected areas came to include,
27. Subsequent case law has held that the area in and around the home is protected
from a trespassory search. See United States v. Molkenbur, 430 F.2d 563, 566 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 952 (1970); Wattenburg v. United States, 388 F.2d 853, 857
(9th Cir. 1968); Texas v. Gonzales, 388 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1968); Care v. United
States, 231 F.2d 22 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932 (1956).
28. Justifying the seizure of evidence, the Court said, "This evidence was not
obtained by the entry into the house ... " 265 U.S. at 58.
29. Id.
30. United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927), first approved the use of a
searchlight, and analogized it to the use of field glasses, paving the way for a large
number of cases that would approve the use of technology-assisted visual searches. See
United States v. Minton, 488 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936
(1974); Fullbright v. United States, 392 F.2d 432 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830
(1968); Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932
(1956); Commonwealth v. Hernley, 216 Pa. Super. Ct. 177, 263 A.2d 904, cert. denied,
401 U.S. 914 (1970). On the use of field glasses and binoculars for searches see On Lee
v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 1178 (1973).
31. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
32. Id. at 464-66.
33. The phrase itself did not appear until 1951 in United States v. On Lee, 193
F.2d 306, 314 (2d Cir. 1951) (Frank, J., dissenting), aff'd, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
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in addition to one's home, 4 a business office,35 a store, 6 a hotel
room,3 7 an apartment, 38 a garage,39 an automobile,40 and a taxi cab;4
trespass came to include governmental intrusion in person,42 or by
microphone or surveillance device.
43
The inflexibility of this rationale led to a hair splitting analysis that
centered upon the physical location of defendant. 44  Katz v. United
States45 presented the Court with an excellent opportunity to alter the
"constitutionally protected areas" rationale. FBI agents had recorded
conversations that were a part of defendant's illegal betting operation
by placing an electronic recording device on the outside of a phone
booth that was occasionally used for defendant's illegal purposes.
Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart noted that the Court would
no longer allow the issues to be formulated in terms of invasion of
constitutionally protected areas. 46  Laying the foundation for his new
framework, Stewart noted that the fourth amendment protects citizens
against certain kinds of governmental intrusion4 7 but that it "protects
people, not places."' 48  The public-private dichotomy was not to be
34. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S.
559 (1927); United States v. Hester, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
35. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
36. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S.
313 (1921).
37. Parks v. United States, 386 U.S. 940, 951 (1966); Hoffa v. United States, 385
U.S. 293, 301 (1966); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); Lustig v. United
States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949).
38. See Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961); Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. 257 (1960); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
39. Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932).
40. Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927).
41. See Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
42. Id.; Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927).
43. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961); On Lee v. United States, 343
U.S. 747 (1952).
44. In 1964 the Court found that a trespass had been committed when a micro-
phone the size of a thumbtack had been put in a common wall. Clinton v. Virginia, 377
U.S. 158 (1964) (concurring opinion), rev'g per curiam Clinton v. State, 204 Va. 275,
130 S.E.2d 437 (1963). Earlier, the Court had held that a microphone placed against a
partition wall to monitor conversations was not a trespass, Goldman v. United States,
316 U.S. 129 (1942), but that the penetration of a tiny "spike mike" through a wall
required the application of the fourth amendment protections. Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). Clearly, the intrusion issue became outdated with the
advanced surveillance technology developed during this forty year period.
45. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
46. Id. at 349-53.
47. But Justice Stewart also stated that fourth amendment protections are not
aimed at guaranteeing a general right to privacy, the protection of which is generally left
to the individual states. Id. at 350-51.
48. Id. at 351.
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based upon prior determinations of which enclosed areas were consti-
tutionally protected, but rather upon what an individual knowingly ex-
posed to the public and what he sought to preserve as private.4 9 Physi-
cal intrusion was no longer an essential factor. ° Under the new ration-
ale an individual was due the protection of the fourth amendment
whenever he justifiably relied upon an expectation of privacy."'
In Santana, the Court found support for the arrest by looking to
another recent case, United States v. Watson,52 in which it was held
that the warrantless arrest of an individual in a public place upon
probable cause does not violate the fourth amendment. Under the
Watson rationale, therefore, if the state can show that defendant
Santana's doorway is a public place, then the attempted arrest is justi-
fiable, as are the pursuit of defendant Santana into her home in order
to complete the arrest53 and the seizure of the heroin packets spilled
49. Id. at 351-52.
50. The Court specifically overruled the trespass requirements stated in Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), and Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129
(1942). 389 U.S. at 353.
51. id. In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan laid out a two-pronged test that
has become commonly used to determine whether an individual justifiably relied on an
expectation of privacy: "first, that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy, and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared
to recognize as 'reasonable.'" Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). While the test appears
to have two parts, it seems unlikely that a court will often make use of the first criterion.
It can be assumed that an expectation will be alleged in most cases, and that it will be
found lacking only when an individual does something that would clearly undermine that
claim, such as the display of contraband in a crowded public area. The second criterion
should be determinative in most cases, however. The alleged expectation must appear
reasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances and in light of societal values, a
standard that is very close to the reasonable man standard found in tort law. See Note,
The Concept of Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 6 U. MICH. J. LEGAL REF. 154,
178-79 (1972).
The use of societal values as a standard in the determination provides substantial
flexibility in the application of the test, although the obvious difficulties of arriving at an
adequate definition of so broad a phrase insured that the Court would rely on the
previously determined "constitutionally protected areas" as a starting point for analysis.
A particularly good discussion of the Katz standards can be found in United States v.
Vilhotti, 323 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
[T]o ascertain what constitutes an unreasonable search the court must evaluate
a person's efforts to ensure the privacy of an area or activity in view of both
contemporary norms of social conduct and the imperatives of a viable demo-
cratic society ...
. U]nder Katz, an agent is permitted the same license to intrude as a
reasonably respectable citizen would take. Therefore, the nature of the prem-
ises inspected-e.g., whether residential, commercial, inhabited or abandoned-
is decisive; it determines the extent of social inhibition on natural curiosity
and, inversely, the degree of care required to insure privacy.
Id. at 43 1.
52. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
53. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1966); McDonald v. United
States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948).
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in the process.5 4 Accordingly, the entire case turns on the characteri-
zation of defendant's doorway.
On the face of it, the description of the threshold of a residence
as a public place appears rather bizarre. A doorway is not a place one
expects strangers to cross or gather without having some legitimate
business to conduct with the occupant. While not actually within the
confines of the "home" a doorway is directly attached to it, and in this
case, separated from the public path by some fifteen feet of property
that might also be considered private. 55 A comparison with the public
place involved in Watson adds no greater strength to the Santana
rationale. Watson was arrested in a public restaurant during the lunch
hour, a place where one's claim to a specific spot is temporary, and
where one can expect to be surrounded by a substantial number of
unknown persons.56
To justify the Court's decision in Santana, Justice Rehnquist dis-
tinguished the private-public dichotomy as it is applied in a common
law property context from its application in a fourth amendment con-
text.57  The common law protected one's home and its immediate
grounds from physical trespass because they were considered private.
Under Hester, Justice Rehnquist indicated, what is not hidden from the
view, hearing and touch of the world around the individual is not pro-
tected by the fourth amendment. 58  The cases that follow Hester
support that position,59 and further, support the proposition that
government agents have at least the same right to visual search as
would a disinterested citizen since the agents are allowed to trespass
upon an individual's property to obtain a view of the "open field."
Given this interpretation of Hester, Santana's doorway would hardly be
a protected area, as she was fully visible from a public street only five
feet away. There are, however, no limits that can be drawn on visual
(and presumably aural and olfactory)6 0 searching under the Hester
rule. In an age of highly advanced surveillance techniques and equip-
54. See note 13 supra.
55. 96 S. Ct. at 2408.
56. 423 U.S. at 413.
57. 96 S. Ct. at 2409.
58. The Court could use Hester to define the type of "place" in which the
defendant was found, because the Katz case, while clearly overruling the Olmstead-
Goldman line of cases, did not overrule the line of cases defining "constitutionally
protected areas." See 389 U.S. at 352.
59. Fullbright v. United States, 392 F.2d 432 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
830 (1968); Hodges v. United States, 234 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1957); Care v. United
States, 231 F.2d 22 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932 (1956).
60. See Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974).
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ment, a simple extension of the Hester ruling would require that an
individual spend a good deal of his life closing shades and curtains,
whispering or writing messages rather than conversing, and burning
any trash or garbage that could be marginally incriminating.,1 In con-
trast, Katz offers a more balanced approach to the questions of public
versus private places. While not eliminating the locational aspects of
the issue altogether, it focuses on the reasonableness of an individual's
expectation of privacy. Katz, although in a public place and exposed
to public view, could reasonably expect his conversations to remain
private.1
2
Rehnquist's use of the Katz case in Santana indicates that he reads
Katz as a mere extension of the Hester rationale. He quotes, out of
context, the rule that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own house or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection," 6 never recognizing that in Katz, the Court
accompanied that rule by another: that "[w]hat [a man] seeks to
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may
be constitutionally protected." 4  There was no discussion in the
opinion of whether Santana might have justifiably relied upon an ex-
pectation of privacy as mandated by Katz, but rather the opinion con-
tained only a simple statement that Santana was not in an area where
she had any expectation of privacy." The predication of her expecta-
tion of privacy upon the area in which she was located looks very much
like the application of the "constitutionally protected areas" rationale
that was discredited in Katz.
Failure to use the Katz rationale in this case seems odd. Had
Katz been applied in full, the Court would probably have reached the
61. An extensive survey of state and federal cases involving governmental surveil-
lance has led one author to conclude that
we have the specter of a fourth amendment which protects any man who re-
treats into his home to be free from unreasonable intrusion. Any man, that is,
who is wealthy enough to afford a windowless, soundproof house, built on an
extensive area of land and surrounded by high fences, and a man who is willing
to live the life of a hermit, staying inside his home at all times, prepared to
take affirmative action to counter any new technological methods of intrusion
with which the government might be equipped.
Note, Katz and the Fourth Amendment: A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy or, A
Man's Home Is His Fort, 23 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 63, 72 (1974). See also Comment,
Police Helicopter Surveillance and Other Aided Observations: The Shrinking Reason-
able Expectation of Privacy, 11 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 505 (1975).
62. "[W]hat he sought to exclude when he entered the booth was not the intruding
eye-it was the uninvited ear." 389 U.S. at 352.
63. 96 S. Ct. at 2409 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
64. 389 U.S. at 351-52.
65. 96 S. Ct. at 2409.
1977]
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same result. Assuming that Santana had an expectation of privacy, the
question becomes whether that reliance was justified. Santana was
arguably within her home, an area that is specifically mentioned in the
fourth amendment and that the courts have treated as uniquely
deserving of protection, 6 but the greater number of cases that argue
for special protection for the home are concerned with trespassing
rather than visual searches. 7  It could have been argued that while
Santana could expect certain types of privacy as she stood in her
doorway, she certainly could not expect that her person would not be
noticed and identified by the public some fifteen feet away. Katz
justifiably relied upon a right to privacy in his conversations, though
he could not reasonably expect to be free from visual search. Santana's
failure to make any effort to conceal her person destroys any claim to
visual privacy that she might have had. Once that privacy is lost, even
under Katz, her arrest would likely be held valid given the existence
of probable cause.6S
The central issue in Santana was not analyzed sufficiently to
support the Court's determination; the factual basis for the classi-
fication of defendant's doorway as a public place was not discussed in
substantial detail, and the Katz case was not accurately represented in
support of the Court's decision. On the particular facts of Santana, the
Court's mistreatment of the Katz precedent was unnecessary since the
Court could have reached the same decision under a strict application
of the Katz test. The result is one that appears to clear the way for
increased governmental surveillance of individuals' lives.
EDWIN P. CHESTER
66. Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967) ("even the most law-
abiding citizen has a very tangible interest in limiting the circumstances under which the
sanctity of his home may be broken by official authority"); Lewis v. United States, 385
U.S. 206, 211 (1966) ("the home is accorded the full range of Fourth Amendment
protections"); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) ("At the very core
[of the fourth amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and
there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion"); Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383, 389-91 (1914) (invasions of the home without a properly attested warrant
should find no sanction in the courts).
67. This factor, of course, would have been far more important had the Court not
chosen to analyze this case in terms of cases which deal with non-trespassory search.
68. But see authorities cited to the contrary in note 8 supra.
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